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Abstract 
By briefly reviewing three well-known scientific revolutions in fundamental physics (the 
discovery of inertia, of special relativity and of general relativity), I claim that problems that 
were supposed to be crying for a dynamical explanation in the old paradigm ended up 
receiving a structural explanation in the new one. This claim is meant to give more substance 
to Kuhn’s view that revolutions are accompanied by a shift in what needs to be explained, 
while suggesting at the same time the existence of a pattern that is common to all of the 
discussed case-studies. It remains to be seen whether also quantum mechanics, in particular 
entanglement, conforms to this pattern. 
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§1 Introduction 
 
As is well known, in Kuhn’s view scientific revolutions are accompanied by radical 
shifts in the kind of phenomena that are regarded as in need of an explanation. Unfortunately, 
he did not specify the nature of such explanatory shifts, but gave only some examples (Kuhn 
1970, p. 104, and Kuhn 1977, p. 29). In this paper I want to fill this lacuna by claiming that 
the three scientific revolutions in fundamental physics that I will discuss share a common 
pattern that has not been recognized so far, and that differs in some notable respects from 
Janssen’s model of Common Origin Inferences (Janssen 2002a, 2002b).2 The essential 
features of such a pattern correspond to the main thesis of this paper: 
  
                                                
1 I thank the two anonymous referees for helpful criticism and suggestions. I also thank the audience in Montreal 
2 In the revolutionary cases that he analyses, Janssen (2002b) is reluctant to identify Common Origin Inferences 
with Common-Cause Inferences, although in his (2002a) he seems definitely inclined to do so. My view is that 
causation did not play any role (at least in one sense of “causation”) in the discovery of the new theories. 
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T: The discovery of inertia, of special relativity and of general relativity has been 
characterized and made possible by the fact that physical phenomena that were previously 
regarded as crying out for a (particular type of) causal explanation ended up receiving a 
structural explanation in terms of suitable components of a new geometrical model of the 
phenomena.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section (§2), I define what I mean by 
causal explanations and how they relate to dynamical explanations. In (§3) I clarify the notion 
of structural explanations I will be referring to, and how it relates to causal explanations. A 
brief discussion of the question whether structural explanations really explain will allow me 
to shed light on how they could relate to fundamentality in physics. This will require also 
raising the question whether the common pattern that I identify in the three revolutions 
supports a particular theory of scientific explanation (§4). In the three ensuing sections I 
illustrate and defend my main thesis by discussing the three above-mentioned revolutionary 
changes, namely the postulation of inertial motion versus previous causal explanations of 
Aristotle’s “violent motions” (§5), Einstein’s kinematical treatment of the relativistic effects 
in contrast with previous attempts to derive them from the Lorentz covariance of dynamical 
laws governing the inner behavior of rods and clocks (§6), and Einstein’s postulation of a 
curved spacetime versus previous explanations of gravity involving a force (§7).  
My aim in these three sections is to illustrate the central role of structural explanations 
in post-revolutionary theories of fundamental physics. Since the historical details of these 
case studies are well known and − with the exception of those concerning special relativity − 
not particularly controversial,3 I can afford to ignore them. It is only the hypothesis that these 
three case studies exemplify the common pattern specified by T above that needs to be 
defended.  
Before beginning, it is worth stressing that even though I suggest a general thesis about 
all of the case studies I discuss, other instances of revolutionary change might not conform to 
the pattern illustrated here. While I do not claim full generality, the revolutions I discuss are 
certainly important. It remains to be seen whether T can be extended to other major transitions 
                                                
3 The problem is whether relativistic contractions and dilations, and other experimental phenomena concerning 
relativity should be understood dynamically, as Brown (2005) and Brown and Pooley (2006) have it, or 
kinematically, as Balashov and Janssen (2003), Norton (2008), Janssen (2009) and Dorato and Felline (2010) 
have it. Here I will simply assume that the kinematical reading is correct. 
3 
 
 
in the history of physics,4 in particular to quantum mechanics and to explanations of quantum 
entanglement. 
 
 
§2 Causal and Dynamical Explanations in Physics 
 
The notion of causal explanation that I will be referring to below is as “metaphysically” 
deflationary as possible.5 One way to achieve this minimalistic aim is to claim that in physical 
theories some causal explanations are given in terms of a dynamical account of the relevant 
phenomena. A dynamical account involves forces.  
It is only to this kind of causal explanations that my thesis T refers, but this restriction is 
quite plausible. For instance, in classical mechanics the cause that explains the falling of 
objects is the force referred to by Newton’s gravitational law, which is the main dynamical 
law of the theory. In fluid dynamics, it is the resistance of the air that causes parachutes to fall 
at constant speed. The cause in question is a force mentioned in the relevant law that is 
directly proportional to the velocity with which the object moves in the fluid. Analogously, 
the causal relation existing between like or unlike charges is given by Coulomb’s force, while 
the cause that explains the deflection of charges moving in a magnetic field is the force 
occurring in Lorentz’s equation.  
On the basis of these well-known examples, it seems reasonable to assume that to the 
extent that in physics there are causal explanations, at least some of them make reference to 
physical forces. The reason for this claim might be that all physical forces are kind of causes, 
or involve causal relations (Bigelow, Ellis, Pargetter 1988, p. 623). Fortunately, my thesis 
about the common pattern exemplified by the three case studies below does not depend on the 
much more controversial claim that all causal explanations in physics are dynamical 
explanations.  
However, there are some reasons, that I don’t need to defend, that might suggest trying 
to reduce – at least in physics – causal explanations to dynamical explanations yielded by the 
relevant laws. The concept of force is part and parcel of the language in which physical 
theories and physical laws are expressed – despite eliminationist attempts by Hertz (1894) – 
and it is understood quite well. It is much more controversial to advance similar claims for the 
concept of cause, not only for the reasons that have been advanced already by Russell (1912), 
                                                
4 The extendibility to other natural sciences seems an even more remote possibility. 
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but in view of the current lack of agreement about what causation is from a metaphysical 
viewpoint.6 
The reason why I do not need to deny that in physics there might be kinds of causal 
explanations that do not appeal to dynamical laws can be stated simply: what matters for my 
purpose is that in the historical episodes that I want to illustrate, the notion of “cause” that 
was in play was equated with that of “force”. Of course, the revolutionary changes that I am 
about to illustrate could be subsumed under different theories to causation, and I will 
comment on the most natural such reconceptualizations, independently of the historical 
settings that I will be referring to. 
 
§3 Structural explanations 
 
A first motivation for the recent interests in the role of mathematical explanations of 
physical phenomena has come from the philosophy of quantum mechanics. If embedding 
quantum phenomena in appropriate mathematical models provided some form of 
understanding via such models, we could somehow – at least temporarily – alleviate the 
remarkable difficulties in providing an agreed-upon ontological picture of quantum mechanics 
(Hughes 1989a and 1989b, Clifton 1998 and Dorato and Felline 2011). Of course, a generic 
embedding of physical phenomena in a mathematical model may not suffice to provide a 
purely mathematical explanation. According to Hughes (1997), for example, the candidate 
explanans in the mathematical model should also be re-interpreted in physical terms, and 
therefore, possibly, in a causal language. 
A more promising way to defend the role of mathematics in explaining physical 
phenomena comes from topology, and therefore from non-metrical relations between points 
that in part involve our spatial intuition: Königsberg bridges (Pincock 2007) and knots 
(Kitcher 1989 p. 426 and Lange 2013b, p. 490) are an example. In case like these, the 
geometrical representation is immune from particular causal interpretation, since it applies to 
any possible instantiation by physical objects of the abstract topological relations. It is this 
kind of geometrical explanations that comes closer to what I am after: as we will see, what I 
                                                                                                                                                   
5 For a thorough and extremely clear introduction to metaphysical theories of causation, see Schaffer (2009). 
6 As Norton has it: “If we demand a causal explanation that draws on a primitive notion of causation, then we are 
conjuring up a dubious level of causal metaphysics that must be supposed to be antecedent to science. Successful 
explication of that notion of cause has eluded us for millennia” (2008, p. 824, n.5). For a contrary view, see 
Frisch (2009). 
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label “structural explanation” involves purely geometrical notions like, for instance, affine 
structure, projections, sections, curvature, etc.  
This preliminary account, however, needs to be further refined, also in order to contrast 
it with the typical kind of dynamical explanations of phenomena that, according to my thesis, 
have been abandoned by the post-paradigmatic theories to be discussed below. One way to 
characterize such a contrast would be to define structural explanations in a purely negative 
manner. However, if a structural explanation were defined just as an explanation that does not 
appeal to forces, my claim would not be particularly illuminating: it would correspond to 
claiming that whenever a dynamical explanation was effectively abandoned, the replacement 
by an (allegedly genuine) structural explanation was equivalent to the abandonment of a 
dynamical one. A stronger and more general negative characterization should then be 
obtained by contrasting structural explanations with any possible kind of causal explanations 
of physical phenomena (despite disagreements about what causation is). In the literature, this 
position is widely shared (see, among others, Mancosu 2008).  
Nevertheless, it might be objected that the claim that a structural explanation is one that 
does not locate the events to be explained in the causal structure of the world is a purely 
necessary condition. To the extent that a more positive characterization is needed, a sufficient 
condition for having a structural explanation should rather make reference to geometrical 
considerations that appeal to the symmetries defining the geometry of a given spacetime. This 
approach is much more suitable for discussing the revolutions to be presented below, since 
they involve a drastic change in our understanding of space and time. In view of the fact that 
all the physical theories that I discuss presuppose a certain spatiotemporal structure, a 
structural explanation can be defined as an explanation mentioning the symmetries of the 
spacetime in which the post-paradigmatic theory is expressed.7 It in this sense that such 
explanations are essentially geometrical in nature.  
Furthermore, the term geometrical, at least in spacetime theories, can be further 
clarified. As noted by Janssen, a distinction between the geometrical/kinematical language of 
the theory and its physical/dynamical language is very clear, to the extent that there is a sharp 
separation between absolute geometrical objects – where absolute “means independent of 
physical objects”) and physical entities (Janssen 2009, p.27).8 This independence is crucial if a 
structural explanation in terms of absolute geometrical concepts can be given, since it entails 
                                                
7 Here the choice of terminology can be misleading: McMullin (1978, p. 139) defines structural explanations by 
referring to causal language.  
8 The distinction is widely used in the philosophy of space and time at least since Friedman (1983). 
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the existence of geometrical constraints (say, invariance under automorphisms) that any 
possible dynamical or causal law must satisfy.  
The independence in question holds in particular for the first two case studies that I 
discuss, which presuppose a fixed spacetime (Newtonian spacetime and Minkowski 
spacetime respectively). But even general relativity, in which spacetime can (although 
controversially) be identified with a variable metric field,9 does not prevent explanations of 
the gravitational phenomena that are given in terms of the symmetries of a general relativistic 
spacetime. The question whether the constraints given by spacetime symmetries can also be 
interpreted dynamically must be tackled in the particular case studies below, although my 
claim should already be convincing even from this preliminary characterization. The relativity 
principle does not hold because of particular dynamical or causal laws; on the contrary, the 
particular laws have the character they have in virtue of a common geometrical constraint that 
they must satisfy.  
  
§4 The genuinity of mathematical explanations and physical fundamentality 
 
Do mathematical explanations really explain physical phenomena? Bueno and French 
(2012) argue that they don’t, Batterman (2010) and (2013b), among others, endorse them, 
though for different reasons. After having clarified what I mean by structural explanations, 
luckily I don’t have to solve this problem, since my thesis is valid in both alternatives. 
Suppose structural explanations are not genuine, so that explanations of physical 
phenomena can only be given in terms of physical laws or causal processes. In this 
hypothesis, as we will see in more details below, the post-paradigmatic structural explanations 
“explain” by showing that there is nothing to be explained! Such a dissolution of the why-
question amounts to regarding the phenomenon as physically fundamental, or “natural” in the 
sense of Aristotle. From this perspective, the thesis that scientific revolutions entail an 
explanatory switch from a dynamical to a geometrical explanation can be clarified as follows. 
In the post-revolutionary theory, a geometrical “explanation” (i.e. its redescription in 
mathematical language) of a phenomenon P amounts to regarding P as “natural”,10 while a 
new dynamical explanation is called into play only when there is a deviation from the newly 
discovered natural order.  
                                                
9 According to various philosophers, a general relativistic spacetime is to be identified with the manifold, since 
the metric field is a “physical” field (Belot and Earman 2001).  
10 For this sense of “natural”, see Achinstein (1983, p. 291) and Toulmin (1961, p. 45). 
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In this sense, in Aristotelian physics vertical motions were natural, violent motions were 
not. With Newton, inertial motion became the new natural motion of bodies, and it is only a 
deviation from this motion that required a dynamical explanation. Before Einstein’s theory of 
special relativity, contractions of rods and dilations of clocks were regarded as in need of a 
dynamical account, after the revolution they became natural, since these frame-relative effects 
can be redescribed geometrically in terms of sections and projections within Minkowski’s 
four-dimensional spacetime (Dorato and Felline 2010). Finally, in general relativity free fall 
becomes natural and does not require dynamical accounts, and it is only deviations from free 
fall that need to be explained in terms of the presence of masses.11  
If, alternatively, we granted structural explanations a genuine character, we would have 
two possible views, a weaker and a stronger one. According to the former, a 
geometrical/structural explanation does offer some form of “understanding” by providing a 
different conceptual perspective on the explanandum. At the same time, however, such an 
understanding does not provide a deeper physical explanation, for the simple reason that in 
the context of the new theory it cannot be found. This weaker view, therefore, is not so 
different from the one considered before about the naturalness of, say, the Lorentz 
contractions and dilations, and has been advocated by Di Salle: “We can certainly think of 
this [geometric] representation as an explanation of a sort, provided that we don’t confuse 
understanding a theory from a different viewpoint with deriving it from some deeper 
ontological ground” (Di Salle 2006, p.116). The main problem with this weaker view of 
structural explanation is, of course the vague, and psychological notion of “understanding” 
(see Achinstein 1983, and De Regt, Dieks 2005 for an attempt to clarify it).  
A stronger explanatory viewpoint has been defended by Lange (2009, 2013a, 2013b), 
and can be cashed out in terms of the modal character provided to causal laws by geometrical 
explanations in terms of the symmetries of spacetime. According to Lange, distinctively 
mathematical explanations explain “by (roughly) showing how the fact to be explained was 
inevitable to a stronger degree than could result from the causal powers bestowed by the 
possession of various properties” (2013b, p. 487-491). If this were the case, structural 
explanations as characterized in the previous section would explain by conferring to the 
physical phenomena a sort of necessity that they don’t possess; the necessity in question 
                                                
11 Interestingly, also Brown, despite his position on dynamical accounts of relativistic effect, agrees with me in 
thinking that the distinction between natural and non-natural motions has an important role to play in the history 
of physics: “GR is the first in the long line of dynamical theories, based on that profound Aristotelian distinction 
between natural and forced motion, that explains inertial motion” (2005, p.141).  
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depends on the fact that the spacetime symmetries, among them the relativity principle in 
mechanics and electromagnetism and the equivalence principle in GTR, are “meta-laws” 
(Lange 2009).  
However, despite the fact that (i) I don’t need to choose between the weaker and a 
stronger sense presented above, and that (ii) I agree with Lange on the importance of 
symmetries in structural explanations,12 it is important to note that a stronger view about the 
explanatory power of the latter does not necessarily involve modal claims about degrees of 
necessity. On the contrary, the case studies presented in the next three sections seem to be 
better supported by an unificationist account of explanation (see below). 
In a word, when the structural “explanation” dissolves the need for explaining, or 
provides nonetheless some understanding in terms of a reformulation of the previous causal 
problems in mathematical terms (the weak view), the physical phenomena that are 
“explained” by the post-revolutionary theory become natural, that is, fundamental. If 
explanations provided in terms of spacetime symmetries explained instead in the strong sense, 
the explanans would count as fundamental in virtue of the fact that it is a “metalaw”, i.e., a 
geometric constraint on all physical or causal laws. In both alternatives, what is important for 
my purpose is that in the scientific revolutions that I am about to sketch, structural 
explanations can be seen either as geometrical redescriptions of fundamental physical 
phenomena or as themselves fundamental.  
To conclude this section, let me stress that the theory of explanation that is presupposed 
(as well as illustrated) by the historical examples below is not committed to a particular view 
of scientific explanation. However, it is certainly closer to the contextual view (De Regt and 
Dieks (2005) and, as anticipated above, to the unificationist view (Friedman 1974 and Kitcher 
1989). It is contextual because the fact that some phenomena are regarded as crying out for an 
explanation and some aren’t depends holistically on the web of beliefs (Quine and Ullian 
1978) of the scientific community asking the why-questions, and this web obviously changes 
with the historical context. It is unificationist because, as we will see, if structural 
explanations provide understanding, then they do so by unearthing a common structural 
pattern exemplified by all the relevant physical explananda.  
 
§5 From impetus to inertia: the first case study 
 
                                                
12 For the importance of structuralist understandings of spacetime physics, see also North (2009, p. 68) 
9 
 
 
Since according to Aristotle each violent motion requires a mover that be in causal 
contact with the moved object, one of the greatest problems of Aristotelian and post-
Aristotelian physics till Galileo and Descartes was that of explaining the continuation of 
motion in the absence of a visible contact between the original mover and the moved object. 
If we don’t presuppose inertia, the fact that an arrow keeps moving after it has left the bow 
needs an explanation. In the Aristotelian tradition, there were two rival causal accounts: either 
the air pushed by the tip of the arrow moves circularly behind it, thereby pushing the tail, or 
the air receives from the original movers (the hand and the bow) the power to act as a mover, 
so as to move the arrow also after it has left the bow (see Clagett 1961). Even later impetus 
theories (Buridan) postulated a hidden causal power that would continue to act forever on the 
arrow, and in the initial direction of motion, if friction and weight would not alter its action 
(see Grant 1977, Thijssen and J. Zupko 2001). 
This extremely sketchy historical overview is nevertheless sufficient to illustrate my 
thesis: the revolutionary transition to modern dynamics was achieved by transforming a 
particular kind of causal problem (i.e. a dynamical problem) into a structural explanation, 
provided in this case by a new fundamental law of nature of geometrical character.13 Whatever 
in the pre-modern physical theories constituted a problem – for their continuation violent 
motions required explanations in terms of some sort of hidden causal power– with Galileo, 
Descartes and Newton becomes part of a new “natural” order in the sense specified above. In 
the absence of forces, bodies travel with the same speed in the same direction “naturally”, 
where naturally means, as specified above: “no further physical explanation given in terms of 
forces is to be expected”. What needs to be explained after the postulation of inertia is rather 
why bodies do not continue moving in a straight line with constant speed, and for that we 
need a causal notion, a force, which brings about either a change of direction to the vector 
representing velocity, or simply a change in speed. The new classification between what 
needs a causal explanation and what doesn’t constitutes the core of this and other scientific 
revolutions to be discussed later, a fact described by Janssen in terms of the distinction 
between kinematical and dynamical account of phenomena (2002a, 2009).  
I argue that it is important to add to his account that those phenomena that after the 
revolution are postulated as being physically primitive can be understood or explained – recall 
the above distinction between weaker and stronger views of structural explanations – via a 
                                                
13 If laws are postulates, a quotation from Goethe taken from a letter written on 9.8.1828 to his friend Karl F. 
Zelter becomes relevant: «the greatest art in the life of the world and of culture consists in the ability to 
transform a problem into a postulate.» 
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geometrical model. In particular, it is the association between inertial and rectilinear motion 
that explains inertia structurally and geometrically. The structural element in the explanation 
of inertia is revealed by the fact that in the absence of forces, and given that velocity is 
mathematically represented by a vector, the direction and intensity of the vector representing 
an inertial system is conserved: it is only the change in the intensity or direction that needs a 
causal account in terms of forces.  
The structural explanation of inertia is realized via a unification: the geometrical 
structure common to all inertially moving bodies is defined in terms of the global symmetries 
of Galilean spacetime and its invariance under rotations, translations and boosts. The 
unification afforded by the geometrical explanation therefore depends on two related factors; 
the first is the universality of the spatiotemporal symmetries, exemplified everywhere and at 
all times by all inertial systems. The second explains why such symmetries apply to all 
inertially moving bodies: the former are obviously independent of the concrete physical or 
chemical composition constituting the latter. In a word, the structural explanation of inertia 
unifies all the relevant physical explananda by unearthing the common structural pattern that 
they exemplify.  
In more sophisticated and even more anachronistic language, inertial motions can be 
understood in terms of their representative in the appropriate mathematical model, namely the 
affine structure of a neo-Newtonian spacetime (Earman and Friedman 1973), whose geodesic 
are the trajectories of inertially moving particles.14 It is the reference to such geometrical 
descriptions that makes the explanation structural and not causal, in any possible sense of 
causal (not just in the dynamical one). In particular, as pointed out by Lange, the different 
lower-level causal laws obeyed by physical bodies with their different constitution do not 
need to be mentioned in what I take to be the unifying language in which geometrical 
explanations are framed. 
A point here is worth noting, in particular against a common misinterpretation of 
structural explanations in the case of spacetime theories. It does not make sense to claim that 
the structure of neo-Newtonian spacetime causes force-free particles to follow straight lines 
(see also Nerlich 1994, 2010). In full agreement with Brown and Pooley (2006), neo-
Newtonian spacetime “is not a substance with causal efficacy”, as Janssen efficaciously put it 
a propos of Minkowski spacetime (2009, p. 28). Since (i) the discovery of inertia entailed the 
replacement of dynamical explanations with a structural account, and (ii) some causal 
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explanations are dynamical, a structural understanding or explanation of inertia is, to some 
extent, non-causal.15 In agreement with Brown, force-free particles do not follow “grooves” of 
spacetime along which the latter “nudges” them (Brown 2005, p.24). 
In a word, with the demise of Aristotelian physics the natural order of things (what 
needs to be explained) gets transformed, even though the Aristotelian distinction between 
natural and non-natural motions keeps an essential role also in modern physics. As a matter of 
fact, it becomes the distinction between rectilinear (natural) and accelerated (non-natural) 
motion, a distinction that in the Newtonian context must be regarded as objective.  
Therefore, already in this case we see an exemplification of my main thesis: 
revolutionary changes in physical theories can be described as a change in the class of 
phenomena that are regarded as natural or physically primitive. In Aristotelian physics, free 
fall was a natural motion and it was the continuation of motion (violent motions) that needed 
special causes. With Newton, the continuation of motion becomes natural and it is a deviation 
from it that requires causes (the gravitational force).16 From what was said above, it should be 
clear why the naturalness or fundamentality of inertia from the physical point of view does 
not mean that it cannot be understood or explained geometrically via the affine structure of 
spacetime. If structural explanations explain, they do so in terms of this structure, which 
unifies the behaviors of inertially moving bodies by showing the common feature that they all 
instantiate.  
There are at least three objections to a merely structural explanation of inertial motion 
that need to be discussed, since they are going to be relevant also for the next two case 
studies.  
 O1) In order to defend my thesis, in section 2 I stressed the importance of the historical 
language in which the new theories have been formulated. However, according to Newton 
(and to some contemporary readers), bodies are endowed with a vis inertiae, i.e., with both a 
resistance to being accelerated – which is what we today call “inertial mass” –, and with an 
impetus that endeavors to change the state of an obstacle that the body may encounter 
(Newton 1726 [1999], pp. 404-405). According to this objection, even according to Newton 
                                                                                                                                                   
14 Roughly, an affine space is a vector space from which one removes the origin. A vector is therefore specified 
up to translations.  
15 Possible generalizations of this claim will be discussed in the remainder of this section.  
16 The question that I cannot discuss in this context is whether the gravitational law ought to be regarded as 
structural or causal. According to Kuhn, Newton´s law of gravitation was initially received as a merely structural 
explanation, especially among the followers of Descartes, but physicists later got used to it: “[. . .] in physics 
new canons of explanation are born with new theories on which they are, to a considerable extent, parasitic”. 
(Kuhn 1977, p. 29).  
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all bodies have well-defined causal powers (resistance and impetus) that explain with a causal 
language why they “tend” to keep moving in a straight line, whenever they are undisturbed by 
forces. From this viewpoint, not only would the disposition to move inertially be the truth-
maker of the first law, which would otherwise be non-exemplified in the real world; at the 
same time, this disposition could be identifiable with the scientifically respectable notion of 
inertial mass (resistance to acceleration), which, contrary to my thesis, seems to have 
dynamical implications. 
O2) On the basis of the Deductive Nomological model, the first law can be explained 
from the second, of which it is a particular case. Therefore, it might be argued that also the 
law of inertia, being grounded in a dynamical law, has a dynamical content that refers to the 
causal structure of the world: after all, a body is at rest or continues to travel with the same 
velocity because there is no force acting upon it. 
O3) The third objection raises the possibility that inertia can be explained both 
structurally and causally. There are two theories of causation that at this point need to be 
distinguished, since they have conflicting consequences on the interpretation of the law of 
inertia. According to the fist theory, an explanation is causal only if it refers to causes acting 
directly on bodies (see Colyvan 1998, pp. 324-5). Since unaccelerated motion is associated 
with no net force impressed on a body B, in this sense of causation the absence of forces 
acting on B implies the absence of causes, and therefore the unavailability of a causal and 
dynamical explanation of B. After all, “omissions” (in our case, the absence of forces on B) 
cannot be part of real causal processes, since omissions are not real events.  
The second, counterfactual theory of causation, on the contrary, can cite omissions: as 
such, according to Brandon (2006) and (2013b), it can refer to the net of real causes and 
effects. Brandon, for example, argues that when we explain why a given body is moving 
uniformly by citing the absence of forces, we give a sort of “default causal explanation” 
(Brandon 2006, p. 321). While the uniform motion of a body feeling no forces has no acting 
causes in the sense of Colyvan, such a motion has nevertheless a causal explanation, because 
it refers to the dynamical structure of the world. This is evident if we recall the well-known 
formulation of the Principle of Inertia: “a body is in an inertial state unless it is acted upon by 
a force”. By referring to what would happen if we intervened on an inertial system by 
impressing a force upon it, this formulation introduces a reference to forces. As such, this 
explanation of inertia is dynamical, and is therefore a refutation of my thesis.  
 
Let me briefly reply to these objections in turn. 
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R1) First of all, a well-know historical fact is relevant here: the first exact formulation of the 
principle of inertia was due to Descartes, whose physics explicitly rejected any recourse to 
hidden forces,17 regarded by him as a remnant of a magical and anthropomorphic conception 
of the world. Recall that here I am interested in the context of discovery and therefore in the 
way causal explanations were used in the historical period I am referring to. Consequently, it 
is important to take into account that, according to Descartes, dynamical explanations of 
inertia could not exist, and that the only change in the motion of bodies was due to impacts.  
Furthermore, according to Newton resistance and impetus only intervene when some 
force is applied (and inertial motion in these cases is absent). It follows that in such cases it is 
the Principle of Action and Reaction that comes into play (Newton, 1726, ibid.). Even if one 
treated inertial mass as a disposition (a fundamental property of massive bodies), and even 
granting that dispositions explain, what is in question in our case is what explains inertial 
motion, rather than what explains the inertial mass of bodies. And the disposition to move in a 
straight line with the same speed, unlike what happens in Aristotelian physics, makes no 
reference to forces acting on the body. I submit that if we missed this point, we would miss 
the great novelty of the scientific revolution of the modern age. 
 R2) To the extent that inertial motion is the natural state of physical bodies, the first law is 
explanatorily more fundamental than the second, since what needs to be explained in 
Newtonian physics is not why bodies move inertially (a primitive, natural fact), but rather 
why they typically don’t do so due to the intervention of forces.  
Furthermore, two things need to be noted about the DN explanation given above. The 
first is a clarification: the deduction of the first law from the second is mathematical but the 
simple mathematics involved has nothing to do with the kind of structural explanation 
advocated above: when we use the second law in its differential form, Fdt = mdv, the absence 
of net forces, F = 0, entails the constancy of v. The second comment stresses the fact the 
explanatory power of the second law with respect to the first springs from the purely 
mathematical fact that whenever the first derivative of a function is 0, the function (v) is 
constant. However, the fact that this explanation of the first law consists in a mere 
mathematical derivation shows that a DN explanation of the first law from a dynamical law 
does not suffice to claim that the also the former has a dynamical content. In order to provide 
further arguments against the view that the law of inertia (more or less implicitly) makes 
                                                
17 I owe this point to one of the referees. 
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reference to the dynamical structure of the world, we must move to the reply to the third 
objection. 
R3) In order to rebut O3, I will put forward the following three replies, which will also allow 
me to circumscribe my claim more precisely.  
R3.1 Do counterfactual theories of causation entail dynamical redescriptions of the 
principle of inertia? If this were the case, the continuity between the Aristotelian worldview 
and ours would be much more pronounced than my thesis would make us believe. The crucial 
point in order to answer the above question is to note that a body, as Newton himself wrote in 
his fourth letter to Bentley, cannot act “upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without 
the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed 
from one to another” (Janiak 2004, p.102).18 With later language, we would say that even 
according to Newton, the manifestation of forces requires a process theory of causation 
(Dowe 2000), in which causation is a continuous19 process that is capable to describe any 
interaction among physical systems.  
On the contrary, counterfactual theories of causation do not seem suitable to treat 
dynamical interactions, given that they allow for causes that are spatiotemporally 
disconnected from their effects (Schaffer 2000, Hall 2004). Consequently, in view of the 
context of discovery of the principle of inertia, and its possible reconstruction in 
contemporary language, counterfactual theories of causation do not seem to threaten my main 
thesis. To recapitulate this reply with Janssen’s wording (2009), the transition from pre-
Aristotelian physics to Galilei’s and Descartes’ was a reclassification of the problem of 
continuation of motion from a dynamical to a kinematical category, where the latter term, in 
my reading, refers to the symmetries of Galileian spacetime.  
R3.2 This is also confirmed by an extremely sketchy historical consideration. In trying to 
account for the transition from the Aristotelian worldview to the modern one, the notion of 
causation that was involved is efficient or direct causation, in which the cause acts on the 
effect only when it is in contact with it. In this context, counterfactual causation played no 
role. According to Aristotle, in fact, there is an objective distinction between a body at rest 
and a body travelling at constant velocity. The former requires no efficient causation in the 
                                                
18 "It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not 
material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact…That gravity should be innate, inherent, 
and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum, without the 
mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is 
to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of 
thinking can ever fall into it" (Janiak 2004, p. 102) 
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form of a mover, the latter does. In modern physics, the distinction is completely lost, in 
virtue of the indistinguishability between rest and uniform rectilinear motion: the new 
objective distinction is between non-accelerated and accelerated motion. In this restricted 
sense of causation, inertial motion is explained causally only if there is a force actually acting 
on the body. This is all that matters for my thesis, despite the fact that inertia might be 
explained counterfactually by a different theory of causation. 
R3.3 Suppose that, by following Woodward’s approach, we could advance the following 
claim: “if the gravitational force linking the Earth to the Sun were removed by an imaginary 
manipulation, our planet would continue to move forever with the same velocity, so as to 
exemplify inertial motion”. In order for this claim to count as a causal explanation of inertia 
(with allegedly dynamical consequences), the merely logical possibility of an intervention 
must suffice. However, this assumption is per se rather problematic (see also Reutlinger 2012 
for additional arguments). In view of the fact that the force of gravity cannot be screened off, 
a follower of Woodward should grant the physical impossibility of manipulations of the kind 
envisaged above, even if it were a non-anthropomorphic one. For instance, a gigantic black 
hole swallowing the Sun would change also the Earth’s trajectory. However, since the truth of 
the counterfactual above presupposes that there is a logically possible world in which any 
dynamical interaction between the Sun and the Earth is cancelled, my thesis is not 
jeopardized. In that logically possible world W in fact, the Earth’s inertial motion inertia 
cannot be accounted for dynamically, precisely because in W the Sun’s gravitational force is 
removed. 
 
§6 The Special Theory of Relativity: the second case study 
 
The above-illustrated switch from attempts at explaining puzzling phenomena in terms 
of dynamical hypotheses to post-revolutionary redescriptions or explanations in terms of 
spatiotemporal symmetries is even clearer in the case of special relativity. In view of the fact 
that the light quantum hypothesis, put forward by Einstein in 1905, had already convinced 
him that Maxwell’s equation “could not claim to exact validity”, the Light Postulate of special 
relativity (the fact that light has a velocity that is independent of the motion of the source) had 
to be formulated independently of any theory about the inner constitution of light (Brown 
2005, p.77): such an independence is a first, strong evidence for the presence of structural 
                                                                                                                                                   
19 Of course, this holds for classical, non-quantum forces. 
16 
 
 
explanations. For exactly the same reason, Einstein had to postulate the Relativity Principle, 
rather than deriving it from Lorentz covariant dynamical laws involving intermolecular 
forces. Explanations of these kinds had been attempted by FitzGerald, Larmor, Lorentz and 
Poincaré, and were dynamical or causal because they depended on attempts to construe a 
Lorentz covariant theory of the inner constitution of rods and clocks.  
In a word, rather than explaining the Light Postulate or the Relativity Principle by 
postulating some forces, in 1905 Einstein regarded them as physically fundamental. 
According to my characterization of structural explanations, the transformation of two 
dynamical problems into two postulates implies that the Light Principle, the contractions of 
length, the dilations of times, and other experimental evidence mentioned by Janssen (see 
note 21 below) can only be redescribed or explained in that geometrical language that was 
later construed by Minkowski.  
It seems legitimate to conclude that also in this second case, pre-revolutionary 
dynamical explanations have been replaced by post-revolutionary structural explanations. A 
possible objection to this thesis could stress that I am relying on the historically contingent 
fact that Special Relativity was formulated as a Principle theory and not as a Constructive 
theory.20 The objection could continue by stressing that even though the theory originated as a 
principle theory, it ought not to be conceived in this way (Brown 2005), so that contractions 
and dilations should eventually be explained in a causal/dynamical fashion. This seems to 
have been a possibility envisaged by Einstein himself (1919).  
There are three replies to this objection, the first two of which accept the relevance of 
the principle/constructive distinction for the interpretation of this scientific revolutions, while 
the last, more plausibly and in accord to Janssen, denies it. My first reply rejects the claim that 
special relativity ought to be formulated as a constructive theory, for reasons that have been 
already provided by Balashov and Janssen (2003), Dorato (2007) Norton (2008) and Janssen 
(2009), and that here will not be rehearsed.21 My second reply notes that even supposing that 
eventually we will come up with some dynamical explanations for rods’ contraction and 
clocks’ dilations, the fact that historically things went as my thesis requires for my purpose is 
sufficient. Any theory of scientific revolutions should be based, in Ranke´s famous words, on 
                                                
20 Recall that the former raises empirical regularities (like those of thermodynamics) to universal principles, 
while the latter looks for deeper theories (like those of statistical mechanics) that can explain such regularities 
(Einstein 1919). 
21 Unlike Norton (2008), Janssen (2009) more convincingly does not presuppose realism about Minkowski 
spacetime, but insists on the fact that experimental results like the Fresnel drag effect, the velocity dependence of 
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history “as it really went”, and not on unpredictable and – in my view – implausible future 
developments of physics.  
For the third reply I can appropriate what has argued by Janssen: “The principle-
constructive distinction is a red herring in the end. By focusing on it, Lorentz missed a much 
more important difference between his own theory and Einstein’s, namely the difference 
between kinematical and dynamical accounts of a whole class of phenomena. It was for a 
reason that Einstein called the first half of his 1905 paper: ‘‘The kinematical part.’’(2009, p. 
38).22 So in any possible case, the objection is rejected. 
Here I will assume that Janssen is correct. Since I take it that a first component of the 
meaning of “kinematical” is equivalent to “independent of specific dynamical assumptions”, 
the historical fact that in 1905 Einstein derived as kinematical effects what Lorentz wanted to 
explain dynamically is evidence for the first component of my thesis: scientific revolutions 
are accompanied and made possible by the abandonment of pre-revolutionary searches for 
dynamical causes. According to Janssen, kinematical also refers to “a generic feature of the 
world, in [Einstein’s] case instances of default spatio-temporal behavior” (Janssen 2009, p. 
27). I interpret this second, but more unclear specification of the meaning of kinematical, as 
evidence also for the second component of my thesis. As I read this quotation, “the generic 
instances” occurring in it refer to the fact that the physical world exemplifies the geometrical 
structure of Minkowski spacetime. The behavior, say, of the electromagnetic field, and that of 
the other physical fields, is described or explained in virtue of the fact that they share a 
common fourdimensional geometrical structure. And the explanatory force in question 
derives from a theory of explanation that insists on the view that explaining is unifying 
different, seemingly and previously unrelated physical phenomena: all mechanical as well as 
electromagnetic phenomena obey the relativity principle, and therefore exemplify the 
geometrical structure of Minkowski spacetime. The term “default” in the quotation above also 
gives evidence to the third aspect of my thesis: scientific revolutions redefine what is 
physically “natural” (and therefore fundamental) and therefore also what instead needs an 
explanation in dynamical or causal terms.  
In the case of special relativity, the fact that what is physically natural can be explained 
in structural terms is exemplified by the well-known effects of spatial contraction and time 
                                                                                                                                                   
the electron’s mass, and the torques on a moving capacitor in the Trouton–Noble experiment ought to be 
characterized as kinematical rather than dynamical. 
22 I thank one of the referees for having pointed out to me that the distinction between Principle and Constructive 
theories is independent of the structural/dynamical one. 
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dilation. As is well known, such effects are measurable in hadron colliders, and in this sense 
they are perfectly real and objective; and yet they are not real in another sense, given by 
“invariant”. It is the fact that the length or the shape of entities (or the temporal intervals 
between pairs of events) is non-invariant under the full Poincare’s group that motivates a 
structural explanation of the relativistic effects. It is this mathematical fact that renders 
explanations in terms of constructive, law-covered causes or mechanisms completely 
unnecessary. Since one can talk about a definite amount of a contraction only relatively to an 
arbitrarily chosen inertial frame, and since by changing frame we change also the amount of 
contraction, there is no invariant/objective fact (the contraction) to be explained 
causally/dynamically. Consequently, spatial contractions are to be understood as cross-
sections or projections of four-dimensional rods onto different, arbitrarily chosen inertial 
frames of Minkowski spacetime (Balashov and Janssen 2003, Dorato and Felline 2010, 
Hughes 1989a), in the same sense in which the affine structure of spacetime gives a geometric 
account of inertial phenomena. Fully analogous considerations hold for time dilations.  
For this reason, Brown’s complain that “It is wholly unclear how this geometrical 
explanation is supposed to work’’ (2005, p. 134) is unmotivated. However, I agree with him 
when he claims that Minkowski spacetime is “a glorious non-entity” (Brown and Pooley 
2006). In a sense in fact, it is not a substance causing or forcing the spatiotemporal behavior 
of bodies; in another sense, however, the structure of such a spacetime is “really” exemplified 
by the entities inhabiting the spacetime (Stein 1989).23 “Exemplified” has a precise meaning: 
Brown is correct in arguing that the fact that different substances making up the rigid support 
of the interferometer all obey the FitzGerald–Lorentz deformation effect needs an explanation 
(Brown 2005, p. 30). But precisely the independence of the contraction from the particular 
structure of matter making up the interferometer is evidence that the sought-after explanation 
is to be found in the constraints that the relativity principle poses to the laws of nature, and 
therefore in the “unifying” symmetries of Minkowski space–time.24  
In sum, analogously to the question we raised before a propos of uniform motion, what 
before the revolution seemed to be in need of a dynamical or causal explanation was 
accounted for afterwards in structural/geometrical terms! 
                                                
23 A “tertium-quid” view between substantivalism and relationism points to a sort of structural spacetime realism 
(Dorato 2000). 
24 Janssen refers to the unification afforded by Minkowski as an explanation that explains all the relativistic 
effects “in one fell swoop” (2009, p. 49). For similar considerations on the constraints posed to causal laws by 
metalaws, see also Lange (2013a). 
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§7 Einstein’s Principle of Equivalence in general relativity: the third case study 
 
In virtue of Einstein’s Principle of Equivalence in its strong form, a test particle in free 
fall in a homogenous gravitational field is in a state of motion that needs no dynamical 
explanation. Since in virtue of this Principle free fall becomes locally indistinguishable from 
inertial motion, it also becomes a very strong candidate to be physically fundamental or 
natural. It is instructive to note that in Newton’s theory inertial motion was natural and 
therefore explainable only structurally. With the general theory of relativity (GR) instead, 
inertia becomes explainable via the vanishing of the covariant divergence of the stress-energy 
tensor (see also Brown 2005, p. 141). This confirms the contextual theory of explanation 
defended at the end of §4: what counts for natural or physically fundamental in a given 
context can be explained by a successive physical theory in physical, non-purely structural 
terms.  
However, it should be noted that the deductive-nomological explanation of inertial 
motion in GR crucially does not entail that in this theory the free fall of a body receives a 
dynamical account in terms of forces. The trajectories of freely falling bodies in GR are no 
longer regarded – as they were in Newtonian mechanics (leaving aside neo-Newtonian 
spacetime) – as deviations from states of inertial motion caused by the gravitation force.  
In a word, after GR what was previously regarded as being in need of an explanation via 
the introduction of a gravitational force, namely free fall, becomes fundamental or natural. 
Also in this third scientific revolution, the physical fundamentality of free fall is equivalent to 
the fact or at least entails that it is structurally explainable in terms of the new geometry of 
spacetime, in the same sense in which inertial motion and the relativistic effects of the special 
theory of relativity were explained structurally by the geometry of Newton and Minkowski 
spacetime respectively.  
More in detail, in the case of GR the geometrical explanation is based on the well-
known fact that a general relativistic spacetime is locally Euclidean for homogenous 
gravitational field and curved for non-homogenous fields. In the new mathematical model of 
GR, the concrete paths of bodies in free fall are represented by the geodesics of a new curved 
connection of spacetime: geodesics are “the straightest possible lines” of a curved manifold. 
The correspondence between free fall and inertiality, however, is valid only infinitesimally: 
since geodesics have a relative acceleration and deviate, in virtue of the so-called “geodesics 
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deviation equation” it follows that the spacetime to which they belong is curved.25 To the 
extent that in general relativity the geometrical/structural notion of curvature of spacetime 
replaces the concept of force as an explanation of gravitational phenomena, my main thesis is 
confirmed also for GR. As in the previous cases, the revolutionary explanatory switch entails 
that what appeared as puzzling (the deviation from inertial motion realized by free fall) and 
requiring a force regarded as a particular type causal relation, is now regarded as physically 
fundamental and therefore explainable only structurally, in the progressively stronger senses 
of explanation described in §4.  
There are at least three objections to the claims just stated in the previous paragraph.  
O1) The first is raised by Salmon’s question whether, at takeoff, a helium-filled balloon 
moves toward the rear or toward the front of the airplane containing it (Salmon 1989, p. 184). 
However, Salmon claimed that one could explain the phenomenon of the balloon moving 
forward by using two different accounts, one structural, relying on the Principle of 
Equivalence, and one citing causal models involving the pressure of the air inside an airplane 
that moves forward. The existence of a structural explanation, in other words, does not 
exclude a dynamical explanation in terms of a pressure gradient exerting a force on the 
balloon.  
R1) Despite the correctness of Salmon’s example, which refers to the fact that 
phenomena observed inside a cabin at rest in the Earth’s gravitational field are 
indistinguishable from those observed in a cabin which is accelerated in the opposite direction 
with -g, it remains true that in GR the gravitational force is simply non-existent, so that no 
dynamical explanation of gravity can be forthcoming.   
O2) The second objection exploits the counterfactual account of causation referred to 
above, and applies it to the current case study.  
R2) To the extent that only some causal explanations in physics are given in terms of 
forces, and my thesis concerns only the replacement of dynamical explanations with structural 
explanation, I could afford to ignore counterfactual approaches to causation altogether. In any 
case, even if one insisted in wanting to defend a causal account of free fall in GR in terms of 
counterfactuals, one should consider the existence of “empty” solutions of Einstein’s field 
equations. As a consequence, for instance, Woodward’s counterfactual explanation of gravity 
could not amount to the claim: “if matter had not been present, spacetime would not have 
been curved”. Curvature can be present independently of the existence of matter and is not a 
                                                
25 The geodesics deviation equation links the existence of a reciprocal acceleration between geodesics to a non-
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causal explanation of gravity, otherwise we would have to accept the already rejected view 
that the geometry of spacetime “nudges” test particle to follow geodesics.  
O3) The third objection is based on the highly plausible remark that in GR the geometrical 
notion of metric field is identified with the physical notion of the gravitational field. It could 
therefore be objected that in GR one can hardly distinguish structural from causal 
explanations. If the explanation provided by the curvature of spacetime is both causal and 
structural (i.e., given in terms of the geometrical model of a curved Riemannian manifold 
with Lorentz signature), GR would falsify my claim.  
However, there are at least three replies to O3, which amount to a definite rejection of 
the objection. 
R3.1 The explanatory role of gravitational phenomena in GR is played by a geometrical 
notion (curvature), defined in terms of the deviation of geodesics, which in its turn refers to 
another geometric notion representing (in the mathematical model) the trajectory of non-
dynamical, force-free particles. Importantly, as in two case studies, these geometrical notions 
are independent of any possible instantiation by concrete physical systems obeying the 
relevant causal laws. And due to this unification, they explain. 
R3.2 The idea of giving a causal explanation of the features of the metric tensor in terms 
of the matter-energy tensor is fraught with problems. The former tensor is in fact necessary 
also to define the latter, given that it is present on both sides of Einstein’s field equations. The 
equality sign in these equations therefore should be regarded as a correlation of the two fields 
and not as referring to causal relations existing between them. The above-mentioned fact that 
we can have a gravitational field in a curved spacetime without a matter field suggests that 
matter does not necessarily acts on spacetime by “telling it how to curve”.  
R3.3 Finally, if the deviation of geodesics is part of the meaning of curvature in virtue 
of a well-known theorem, why supposing that matter causes spacetime curvature?26 
 
In a word, the common pattern illustrated in the previous case studies is present also in 
the revolutionary change leading to GR: answers to why-questions that were given in 
dynamical terms by the prerevolutionary theory have been replaced by structural explanations 
based on the symmetries of the relevant spacetime. In the case of GR, such symmetries are 
given by active diffeomorphism invariance, given that general covariance might have no 
physical meaning. 
                                                                                                                                                   
null Riemann curvature tensor (Wald 1984, pp. 46-47). 
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§8 A brief comparison with Kuhn’s view and two open questions 
 
In Kuhn’s view, scientific revolutions are essentially characterized by radical shifts in 
the meaning of key theoretical concepts, which have repercussions in what counts for an 
adequate explanation of a phenomenon.27 On the contrary, here I have argued that the three 
fundamental scientific revolutions that I have discussed share a common pattern and are the 
consequence of the same explanatory “switch”: in principle, there is no need to assume shifts 
of meaning. Phenomena that before the revolution seem in need of dynamical explanations, 
after the revolution become physically fundamental or “natural”, and are therefore understood 
or explained in purely geometrical terms. To the extent that forces belong to the language of 
physics and are particular types of causal explanations, these scientific revolutions have been 
accompanied also by the abandonment of causal explanations.  
The fact that the scientific revolutions that I discussed above can be characterized by the 
successful identification of a new natural order of things also explains why philosophy and 
conceptual analysis have played an important historical role in all of them, in particular to 
dissolve the explanatory conflict between the new and the old theory. In this respect, the 
importance of a philosophical analysis of scientific revolutions is also suggested by the 
following, still unexplored hypothesis. The idea is that some explanations that prevailed in the 
pre-revolutionary theories might have been suggested by innate views of the physical world. 
For instance, is the Aristotelian belief that any motion presupposes a mover part of the naïve 
physics of our brain? Why do we naturally believe that the present moment is cosmically 
extended, even after the discovery that simultaneity is relative? And more generally, is our 
belief that there exist forces only grounded in the culturally acquired physics? If these beliefs 
had been somewhat hardwired in our brains by evolution, a reconciliation of the pre-
revolutionary and the post-revolutionary explanatory demands would entail that in the three 
case studies the search for forces has been suggested by our “manifest image of the world” 
(Sellars 1962). Consequently, the revolutionary steps forward in our knowledge of the world 
would have been made possible by the realization that a central component of the manifest 
image was illusory. Such a realization, therefore, could not be interpreted as giving rise to 
Kuhn´s well-known “losses” (Kuhn 1962, pp. 99–100).  
                                                                                                                                                   
26 See also Nerlich (2010, p. 190). 
27 For instance, as a consequence of a radical theoretical change, he noted how, during the 17th century, the 
search for explanations in terms of occult qualities was replaced by mechanical explanations (Kuhn 1970, 
p.104). 
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The second open question is that the important role played by structural explanations 
may depend on the fact that all of the three revolutions involved new spacetime theories. A 
task that is still ahead is to test the pattern suggested here also in the quantum revolution. For 
instance, we could ask whether attempts to explain quantum entanglement causally might not 
be completely wrongheaded. What if the quantum correlations between the measurement 
outcomes of entangled particles don’t need any causal explanation (as argued already by Fine 
1989)? This hypothesis would fit amazingly well with the pattern of scientific change that I 
have illustrated so far. Significantly, in this case “causal” would not refer just to explanation 
in terms of forces, but – due to the randomness of quantum theory – would also extends to 
counterfactual and “interventionist” accounts of causation. It would then follow that in the 
quantum case, the explanatory switch illustrated above would entail that rather than trying to 
explain the quantum non-local correlations in terms of the causal ontology of the previous, 
classical theory of the world of our experience, we ought to accept them as paradigmatic 
examples of a new fundamental order of nature. We should therefore presuppose such new 
natural order in order to explain what we have been taking for granted so far, namely the 
local, separable nature of the classical world of our experience, and account for the 
correlations in terms of the structure of the Hilbert space.28 This claim would seem to be 
justified by the fact that entanglement is unanimously considered to be the main conceptual 
novelty with respect to the classical world.  
If this hypothesis were correct, the question that remains open in the philosophy of 
quantum mechanics would not be the non-separability of the measurement outcomes – which 
would have to be regarded as unexplainable and primitive – but rather the emergence of a 
classical world. Currently, this problem is tackled via dynamical reduction models, or, in 
Everettian approaches, via decoherence, that allegedly explains to local observers the 
appearance of quasi-classical worlds that don’t interfere. In Bohmian mechanics, the question 
is sometimes regarded as explaining the emergence of the three-dimensional macroscopic 
world out of an ontology that regards as fundamental the 3N space in which the wave function 
allegedly evolves (Albert and Ney 2013). This paper is, in part, also an invitation to explore 
whether the explanatory switch suggested above is valid also in the quantum case. 
                                                
28 Dorato and Felline (2011) is a first stab in this direction. 
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